ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

Zhun Wang[1,✉] **Nico Schiller**[2,✉] **Hongwei Li**[3,✉] **Srijiith Sesha Narayana**[2,✉]
Milad Nasr[5] **Nicholas Carlini**[5] **Xiangyu Qi**[6] **Eric Wallace**[6]
Elie Bursztein[7] **Luca Invernizzi**[7] **Kurt Thomas** [7] **Yan Shoshitaishvili**[4] **Wenbo Guo**[3]
Jingxuan He[1] **Thorsten Holz**[2] **Dawn Song**[1]

[1]UC Berkeley [2]Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy [3]UC Santa Barbara
[4]Arizona State University [5]Anthropic [6]OpenAI [7]Google

Abstract

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is *exploitation*: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

⚠ Main experiments are conducted under trusted-access programs with safeguards disabled to measure the capability boundary of frontier models and agents.

1 Introduction

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) and AI agents has led to rapid improvements in cybersecurity capabilities, making rigorous evaluation increasingly urgent. Prior work has introduced benchmarks for a range of cybersecurity-related tasks, such as vulnerability reproduction [62], patch generation [63], and Capture-the-Flag problem solving [49, 65]. Frontier models now achieve strong

*The benchmark design and experimental methodology are developed by the academic authors. Industry partners provided feedback on the benchmark design, facilitated access to their models, and assisted with running select experiments.

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performance on many of these benchmarks [2, 38], highlighting the need to better understand and evaluate the boundaries of their cybersecurity capabilities.

Exploitation: A Critical Missing Piece in Cybersecurity Evaluation. A crucial yet underexplored capability is *vulnerability exploitation*. Exploitation is a challenging task that starts from an initial vulnerability (e.g., a few-byte buffer overflow), progressively obtains stronger primitives and privileges (e.g., arbitrary memory reads/writes), and ultimately causes a concrete security impact (e.g., unauthorized file access or code execution). In contrast to prior benchmarks that primarily require source-level reasoning [28, 62], exploitation demands precise reasoning about low-level program behaviors at runtime. This includes understanding and manipulating memory layouts (e.g., heap metadata, stack frames, and virtual memory mappings), reasoning about instruction-level control flow and register states, and crafting inputs that satisfy tight constraints. Modern exploitation further requires chaining multiple primitives together and bypassing a succession of deployed mitigations (e.g., ASLR [42], stack canaries [11], and sandboxing [22]). Indeed, exploitation has remained difficult even for human security researchers despite decades of research [27, 36, 45, 48, 52]. Moreover, exploitation is inherently dual-use and impacts both defenders and attackers. On the defense side, it helps assess vulnerability severity, prioritize patches, and validate mitigation. Meanwhile, it can also lower the expertise required for offensive misuse. Understanding the exploitation capabilities of frontier AI is therefore essential for AI safety and responsible model deployment [3, 37, 57].

ExploitGym: The First Comprehensive Exploitation Benchmark for AI Agents. In this work, we introduce ExploitGym, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Each instance in ExploitGym consists of a vulnerable codebase with build configurations, a proof-of-vulnerability (PoV) input that triggers a known vulnerability along with a textual description, and an execution environment for agent interaction. The agent is tasked with transforming the PoV into a working exploit. We focus on exploits that achieve *unauthorized code execution*, i.e., executing code with privileges that should not be obtainable under the intended security model. We choose this target because it represents one of the most severe security outcomes, demonstrating full control over the victim system and enabling a range of downstream harms such as secret exfiltration and resource hijacking. To reliably validate successful exploitation, each environment contains a dynamically generated privileged flag that is inaccessible without unauthorized code execution, and the agent must retrieve and submit the flag. In addition, we include agent-as-a-judge to assess whether the submitted exploit actually relies on the provided vulnerability rather than succeeding through an unrelated shortcut (e.g., a different but more easily exploitable vulnerability).

ExploitGym is Large-Scale, Diverse, and Realistic. Our benchmark comprises 898 instances derived from real-world vulnerabilities that affected popular software projects across three major domains. We first include 520 userspace instances from 161 projects in OSS-Fuzz, Google's continuous fuzzing service [19]. To cover additional critical software infrastructure, we further include 185 instances from Google's V8 JavaScript engine, used in Chromium-based browsers, and 193 instances from the Linux kernel. For each instance, we evaluate two security settings: with and without standard defenses enabled. These defenses are the result of decades of system-security research [11, 22, 31, 42, 55] and represent common mitigation barriers that real-world exploits must overcome. This setup benefits both security practitioners, who can reassess established defenses against powerful AI-driven attackers, and AI researchers, who can study whether frontier models can reason through complex, multi-step mitigation barriers. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments to ensure easy use and reproducibility of the benchmark.

Experimental Results Reveal Non-Trivial Exploitation Capabilities Using ExploitGym, we evaluate a wide range of frontier LLMs and agent scaffolds. The results show that, despite the challenging nature of exploitation, frontier AI agents can already achieve a non-trivial fraction of success when standard defenses are disabled. In particular, Claude Mythos Preview with Claude Code and GPT-5.5 with Codex CLI, the best-performing combinations, solves 157 and 120 instances within a two-hour time limit, respectively. We further observe that enabling standard defenses substantially reduces success rates but does not eliminate them entirely. Beyond aggregated success scores, we analyze performance differences across domains, overlaps between agents, time budgets, and a detailed case study to enable a deeper understanding of agent behavior. Overall, our results indicate that frontier AI is rapidly advancing toward fully automated exploit generation. These results highlight the growing importance of responsible model development and deployment, as well as the urgent need for stronger exploit-resistant defenses against increasingly capable AI-driven attackers.

2 Related Work

Vulnerability Discovery and Exploitation. Vulnerability discovery is a fundamental cybersecurity task, and fuzzing has become one of the most effective approaches for identifying security flaws in complex software systems [33, 66]. Existing fuzzers range from general-purpose ones, such as AFL++ [14] and libFuzzer [32], to domain-specific ones for JavaScript engines [8, 23, 41] and OS kernels [47, 59, 60]. Large-scale infrastructure projects such as OSS-Fuzz [19], ClusterFuzz [18], syzbot [17], and kernelCTF [21] continuously discover, reproduce, and archive vulnerabilities with artifacts such as crashing inputs and vulnerable revisions. Public issue trackers [54] further provide manually reported vulnerabilities and exploit-relevant discussions. These systems provide essential infrastructure for discovering, reproducing, and triaging vulnerabilities, and their artifacts offer a natural starting point for AI-agent evaluations. However, they were not designed as benchmarks. In contrast, ExploitGym transforms vulnerability artifacts into controlled evaluation tasks with standardized prompts, execution environments, configurable defenses, and reliable exploit validation.

Exploitation has remained highly challenging despite decades of security research [51, 53]. A broad range of techniques exists, including stack-smashing attacks [36], return-oriented programming [45, 48], and data-oriented programming [27], often designed to bypass increasingly sophisticated mitigations. Prior work has also explored automated exploit generation [5, 7, 25, 26, 61]. However, these approaches often rely on strong assumptions about vulnerability classes (e.g., stack or heap overflows), exploit structures such as fixed primitives, or execution environments (e.g., certain defenses disabled or predetermined heap layouts). In contrast, ExploitGym provides a unified and reproducible benchmark spanning multiple software domains and mitigation settings, enabling systematic evaluation of modern AI-driven exploitation generation.

Cybersecurity Benchmarks for AI Agents. Recently, we have seen growing interest in constructing cybersecurity benchmarks for evaluating AI agents, because of the high stakes of this area. We summarize these efforts in Table 1 and compare them with ExploitGym. Among existing benchmarks, NYU CTF [49], Cybench [65], CVE-Bench [67], and BountyBench [64] include exploitation tasks. However, these benchmarks are relatively small in scale (at most 200 instances) and primarily focus on either capture-the-flag environments (i.e., synthetic vulnerabilities on relatively small codebases) or userspace software. In contrast, ExploitGym provides a substantially larger benchmark (898 instances) constructed from real-world vulnerabilities spanning userspace programs, browser (V8), and the Linux kernel, together with configurable security defenses and reproducible execution environments. This makes ExploitGym the first comprehensive benchmark for exploitation. The remaining benchmarks [10, 29, 35, 50, 58, 62] focus on complementary cybersecurity capabilities rather than exploitation itself, including vulnerability reproduction, patch generation, and secure code generation.

Table 1: Comparing ExploitGym with existing cybersecurity benchmarks for AI agents. Domains: C = capture-the-flag, U = userspace, B = browser, K = kernel.

Benchmark	Exploit	Domain	Size
NYU CTF [49]	✓	C	200
Cybench [65]	✓	C	40
CVE-Bench [67]	✓	U	40
BountyBench [64]	✓	U	40
BaxBench [58]	✗	U	392
PatchAgent [63]	✗	U	178
SEC-bench [29]	✗	U	200
SeCodePLT [35]	✗	U	1658
CyberGym [62]	✗	U	1507
SecRepoBench [50]	✗	U	318
SecureAgentBench [10]	✗	U	105
ExploitGym (Ours)	✓	U+B+K	898

Our work also aligns with recent efforts on evaluating potentially dangerous capabilities of frontier models [1, 30, 44]. In this context, higher scores on ExploitGym reflect stronger exploitation abilities or risks, but not necessarily better or safer models overall.

3 ExploitGym Benchmark

This section presents the ExploitGym benchmark. We describe the evaluation protocol (Section 3.1), the task domains along with their security models and configurable mitigations (Section 3.2), and the data sources and construction process (Section 3.3).

3.1 Evaluation Protocol

Agent Input. As illustrated in Figure 1, every benchmark instance ships with three categories of information: (i) *build information*, including source code, build configurations, and build scripts



Figure 1: Overview of ExploitGym. A vulnerability paired with a mitigation setting defines a task instance, which provides the agent with build, vulnerability, and runtime information. The agent interacts with a restricted remote target to develop exploits. Success is verified in two stages: flag verification confirms unauthorized code execution, and an agent-as-a-judge assesses whether the exploit targets the provided vulnerability.

sufficient to reproduce the vulnerable binary; (ii) *vulnerability information*, including a PoV input that triggers the bug, a description of the vulnerability, and a patch revealing its root cause; and (iii) *runtime information*, including the compiled binaries (executables and kernel images) together with a launch script specifying the runtime configuration. Individual mitigations can be toggled on or off, allowing us to evaluate agent performance both with and without specific defenses enabled. The vulnerability information is configurable: each component can be included or withheld independently, allowing us to measure how agent performance changes as less guidance is provided. By default, the patch is withheld to simulate realistic exploitation conditions.

The agent interacts with a remote target whose vulnerable entrypoint is exposed within a controlled authorized scope (e.g., executed by an unprivileged user). The form of the entrypoint and the boundaries of the authorized scope depend on the task domain (detailed in Section 3.2). The remote target supports multiple rounds of interaction, and the agent can send requests to a controller server to reset the target to a clean state. All components are packaged in containerized environments to ensure consistent and reproducible evaluation.

Flag Captured. Each target environment contains a dynamically generated flag that is stored outside the agent's authorized scope and is inaccessible through any legitimate interface; retrieving it requires executing code with privileges that should not be obtainable under the specific security model. The agent *captures the flag* by submitting the correct value, demonstrating that it has achieved unauthorized code execution. Flag capture is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success.

Success. We define an exploit attempt as *successful* only if it both captures the flag and passes an *agent-as-a-judge* evaluation. The judge examines the agent's trajectory to assess whether it genuinely leveraged the intended vulnerability rather than succeeding through an unrelated shortcut, such as exploiting a different, more easily exploitable vulnerability or reproducing a known public exploit. This judgment requires multi-step interaction and complex information retrieval and reasoning, motivating the use of an agentic evaluator rather than a single-query check. We provide the judge agent with the full trajectory, the corresponding benchmark input, and all agent-produced artifacts.

3.2 Task Domains

We evaluate exploitation across three task domains that span critical layers of the software stack: userspace programs, the V8 JavaScript engine used in Chromium-based browsers, and the Linux kernel. Each domain defines its own security model and exposes domain-specific defenses as independent toggles (Table 2).

Userspace Software. We target memory-safety vulnerabilities primarily in widely deployed C/C++ projects, such as FFmpeg [13] and OpenSSL [40]. Each vulnerable binary is compiled with sanitizers disabled and served inside a dedicated container as an unprivileged `nobody` user. A `catflag` helper is installed with the setuid-root bit set, meaning it executes with root privileges regardless of the invoking user; thus, the flag is protected and reachable only through genuine code execution within the target process. We toggle two standard defenses independently: stack canaries [11], which place a secret sentinel on the stack to detect overwrites of a function's return address, and ASLR [42] combined

Table 2: Benchmark overview. Each row is one exploitation surface. *Mitigations* lists the defenses exposed as independent toggles.

Category	Sources	# Instances	Mitigation toggles
Userspace	CyberGym / OSV	520	ASLR+PIE, stack canary
Browser (V8)	ClusterFuzz / human reports	185	ASLR, V8 heap sandbox
Linux kernel	kernelCTF / syzbot	193	KASLR, user namespaces

with Position-Independent Executable (PIE) compilation [12], which randomizes memory-region base addresses so that an attacker cannot predict where code and data reside.

Browser (V8). We target the V8 JavaScript engine [56] as used by Chromium. Each target is the standalone V8 shell (`d8`) built at the vulnerable revision and running as an unprivileged user inside a container. We patch `d8` to remove its permissive convenience APIs (e.g., `os.system`, `d8.file.read`), retaining only the minimal surface required by real-world PoVs, so that flag retrieval requires genuine exploitation through a privileged-helper mechanism similar to the userspace setup. We toggle two defenses: OS-level ASLR and the V8 heap sandbox [22], which replaces raw pointers on the managed heap with bounded indices into a per-isolate pointer table, preventing a corrupted heap object from directly yielding an arbitrary virtual address.

Linux Kernel. We target privilege-escalation exploits in the Linux kernel. Each instance is served by a per-connection QEMU/KVM virtual machine (VM). Inside the VM, the agent's process runs under an `nsjail` [16] sandbox that restricts capabilities and namespaces, and the flag resides on a raw block device inaccessible even to a process holding UID 0 within a user namespace, requiring kernel-level privilege escalation that escapes the sandbox boundary. We toggle two controls: KASLR [55], which randomizes the kernel's load address at boot, and user-namespace access [31], which governs whether unprivileged processes can acquire elevated in-kernel capabilities (e.g., mounting filesystems, creating network namespaces) and thereby reach a broader kernel attack surface.

3.3 Benchmark Construction

Constructing ExploitGym requires sourcing real-world vulnerabilities, reproducing them in controlled environments, and curating the artifacts presented to the agent. We summarize the pipeline for each domain below; full details on filtering criteria and mitigation configurations are provided in Appendix B.

Userspace Software. Our primary source is OSS-Fuzz [19] via the CyberGym corpus [62], which provides reproducible Docker environments with a reproducer input and an upstream patch for each bug. We complement these with vulnerabilities in the same projects sourced from OSV [20] that were discovered by means other than fuzzing (e.g., code audits); because these entries lack triggering inputs, we generate PoVs using Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.6, which has demonstrated strong capability for vulnerability reproduction in CyberGym. We manually validate that each PoV satisfies the corresponding vulnerability description. Because the original OSS-Fuzz binaries are compiled with sanitizers that abort on the first memory violation, thereby preventing exploitation, we rebuild every target with sanitizers disabled. We resolve build failures caused by missing dependencies, incompatible toolchains, and stale build artifacts to successfully produce exploitable builds. Finally, we retain 520 userspace instances spanning 161 distinct projects.

Browser (V8). We draw instances from two sources on the Chromium Issue Tracker [54], restricting both to issues filed after 2024 when the V8 heap sandbox was enabled by default, ensuring that sandbox-on evaluations reflect the intended mitigation. From ClusterFuzz [18] reports, we recover PoVs from the unit tests shipped with each patch commit, since fuzzer test cases are private. From human-filed issues, including sandbox-violation bugs from SbxBrk [6], we retain reports that include PoV attachments. Each candidate is validated by building V8 at the vulnerable revision and confirming that the PoV triggers the bug. We additionally record the reproduction output (e.g., V8 crash logs and stack traces) as part of the instance artifacts. In total, we collected 403 candidates with PoVs and referenced patch revisions, and retain 185 validated browser instances.

Linux Kernel. We source kernel vulnerabilities from two repositories: kernelCTF [21], which provides known-exploitable submissions with ground-truth exploits and detailed write-ups, and

Table 3: Agent performance and cost comparison (two-hour timeout). *Success* denotes instances in which the agent exploits the intended vulnerability, shown as the total and broken down by domain: userspace (U), browser V8 (B), and kernel (K). *Cost (USD)* is estimated. The remaining columns report per-task averages over the successful subset (*Succ.*) and over the full benchmark (*Full*). Experiments are conducted under trusted-access programs [4, 39] with safeguards disabled.

Model	Agent	Success				Cost (USD)		Time (min)		LLM Calls	
		Total	U	B	K	Succ.	Full	Succ.	Full	Succ.	Full
Claude Mythos Preview†	Claude Code	157	107	38	12	–	–	54.7	102.1	225.5	289.3
Claude Opus 4.6†	Claude Code	15	12	2	1	8.08	21.76	18.1	66.7	102.3	285.9
Claude Opus 4.7	Claude Code	7	4	3	0	8.64	3.40	22.1	14.4	102.0	54.0
Gemini 3.1 Pro	Gemini CLI	12	10	2	0	8.56	9.02	51.1	75.6	169.5	174.8
GLM-5.1	Claude Code	4	4	0	0	3.75	6.39	63.3	118.0	148.6	245.6
GPT-5.4	Codex CLI	54	38	15	1	12.20	25.43	51.1	103.5	220.1	443.8
GPT-5.5‡	Codex CLI	120	71	27	22	22.99	34.55	49.6	69.8	256.8	375.4

† Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Mythos Preview results are obtained in collaboration with Anthropic.
‡ When OpenAI's default safety filters are enabled, all exploit attempts under default prompting by GPT-5.5 are blocked

syzbot [17, 59], from which we select high-severity memory-safety and data-race bugs on x86/x86_64. For kernelCTF entries, we employ a human–agent collaboration pipeline to distill each full exploit into a minimal PoV that triggers the vulnerability without performing the complete exploitation chain. For syzbot, each report ships with a C reproducer that serves as the PoV; we deduplicate reports for the same underlying bug, preferring upstream kernel reports with the earliest timestamp, and verify each reproducer against the corresponding kernel build. Vulnerability descriptions are derived from the kernelCTF submission write-up, with exploitation details sanitized for kernelCTF instances, and from the syzbot report, together with the reproduced crash log for syzbot instances. After verification, we retain 193 kernel instances.

4 Evaluation

We evaluate a range of frontier models that have strong coding and cybersecurity capabilities according to existing benchmarks [28, 62, 65], each paired with its recommended agentic coding framework: Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.6, Claude Mythos Preview, and GLM-5.1; Codex CLI with GPT-5.4/ GPT-5.5; and Gemini CLI with Gemini 3.1 Pro. To ensure that safety filters do not confound our measurements of raw model capability, we conduct all experiments under OpenAI's Trusted Access for Cyber program [39] and Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program [4], which disable deployment-time guardrails for approved security research. We note that these programs remove only inference-time content filters; any refusal behavior learned during alignment training may still manifest and is itself an interesting signal. Further details on model checkpoints, agent versions, and the experiment environment are provided in Appendix C.

Frontier Models Can Exploit a Non-Trivial Fraction of Real-World Vulnerabilities. We evaluate all agent configurations on the full benchmark with security mitigations disabled and impose a two-hour wall-clock timeout per task. The agents are executed with the same user prompt, including a concise description of the environment and the objective, except Claude Mythos Preview has adjusted prompting through an additional `CLAUDE.md` file. Table 3 reports the number of *successes*, which require not only that the agent achieve unauthorized code execution to exfiltrate the secret flag, but also that it exercise the specific vulnerability provided in the task specification, as validated by an agent-as-a-judge. We also report the average cost, wall-clock time, and number of LLM calls, broken down by the successful subset and the full benchmark.

Among all configurations, Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 achieve the highest success counts (157 and 120 successes, respectively), demonstrating that current frontier agents can exploit a substantial subset of real-world vulnerabilities under controlled conditions. GPT-5.4 also solves a notable 54 tasks, placing it in an intermediate tier. The remaining model–agent pairings solve fewer than 15 tasks each, underscoring that end-to-end exploitation remains challenging and sharply differentiates today's frontier systems. Notably, Claude Opus 4.7 achieves fewer successes than

Claude Opus 4.6 despite being a newer checkpoint, and does so at substantially lower cost on the full set. Trace inspection reveals that Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro frequently conclude early after judging the target vulnerability non-exploitable. We also observe 36 refusals from GPT-5.4 and 23 from GLM-5.1, in which the model declines to proceed with exploit development due to safety reasons, highlighting the dual-use tension inherent in the benchmark. To study the effectiveness of deployment-time safety filters, we re-enable OpenAI's default safety filters for GPT-5.5 and use the default prompting. In 88.2% of cases, the agent is blocked before making any tool call; in the remaining cases, despite non-trivial execution averaging 4.4 valid LLM requests, the agent remains in the reconnaissance stage and makes no progress towards exploitation.

Agents Independently Discover and Exploit Alternative Vulnerabilities Beyond the Intended Attack Path. Table 4 shows the flag-to-success alignment rate for each model. The gap between the two metrics indicates that agents frequently achieve unauthorized code execution via a vulnerability other than the provided one, which is a finding we view as an important capability signal in its own right. We nonetheless adopt *Success*, i.e., exploitation of the target vulnerability, as our primary metric rather than *Flag* for two reasons. First, real-world software often contains multiple flaws, many of which may be easier to exploit than the intended target. Agents may also already know about vulnerabilities in older software versions. Second, focusing the evaluation on a specific vulnerability enables controlled comparison across agents and aligns with the defensive use case of assessing the severity of a particular flaw in practice.

Alignment rates range from 36.4% (GLM-5.1) to 83.1% (GPT-5.4), with considerable variation across models. Notably, the two highest-flag models, GPT-5.5 and Claude Mythos Preview, align at only 56.7% and 69.5%, meaning 90 and 69 of their solves, respectively, succeed via an unintended path. Through manual trace inspection, we identify two recurring patterns behind these divergences. In the more common case, the agent discovered a nearby but more powerful flaw while analyzing the target vulnerability, such as an adjacent code path with weaker input validation or a related primitive that yields a more reliable exploit, and pivots to it. In a rarer but more striking pattern, the agent concludes that the provided vulnerability is non-exploitable under the given conditions and proceeds to search for entirely new attack surfaces, sometimes by auditing source code and, in a few instances, by performing dynamic fuzzing. Both patterns underscore that frontier agents can independently discover and exploit vulnerabilities in realistic environments, even without prior knowledge of specific flaws.

Table 4: Flag-to-success rate

Model	Flag	Succ.	Rate
Opus 4.6	36	15	41.7%
Opus 4.7	9	7	77.8%
Mythos Prev.	226	157	69.5%
Gemini 3.1 Pro	18	12	66.7%
GLM-5.1	11	4	36.4%
GPT-5.4	65	54	83.1%
GPT-5.5	210	120	56.7%

Kernel Exploitation Success Is a Strong Signal of Advanced Capability. Breaking results down by task domain reveals a pronounced difficulty gradient (see Table 3). Userspace tasks see the broadest success across models, reflecting their comparatively self-contained nature and richer tooling support. V8 exploitation is substantially harder, with successes concentrated among Claude Mythos Preview, GPT-5.4, and GPT-5.5; the remaining models achieve only marginal success or none. Within the V8 domain, human-reported vulnerabilities yield relatively higher success rates than those discovered by ClusterFuzz. This is consistent with the insight that human-reported bugs tend to carry higher severity ratings and are more likely to have a clear, exploitable impact, whereas fuzzer-discovered crashes often involve shallow or less directly exploitable bugs. Kernel exploitation shows the sharpest separation between current frontier models and the rest: Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 achieve 12 and 22 successes, respectively, while no other model achieves more than one. This gap is a striking trend, and we view kernel-task success as an especially important signal of advanced exploitation capability. Kernel exploitation is qualitatively harder for several reasons. First, the globally shared kernel heap makes memory layout prediction very challenging due to noise from concurrent processes. Second, many kernel vulnerabilities depend on race conditions with timing that the attacker cannot fully control. Third, changes to the version or configuration options can drastically alter the kernel behavior, requiring exploitation strategies tailored to each build. Finally, debugging is severely constrained, as kernel-level observability requires specialized setups, and post-crash feedback is minimal. As a result, even limited success in this domain provides evidence that a model can navigate complex, realistic exploitation settings rather than merely relying on standard tooling or self-contained userspace workflows.

Time–Success Curves Reveal Contrasting Scaling Behaviors. Under the default 2-hour timeout, GPT-5.5 and Claude Mythos Preview time out on 36% and 24% of instances respectively, raising the

question of whether frontier agents can leverage extended computation to solve harder exploits. To investigate, we measure performance as a function of wall-clock time with a 6-hour per-instance timeout. Due to the cost of this extended budget, we restrict the analysis to Claude Mythos Preview and Claude Opus 4.6. Figure 2 plots the cumulative number of successful exploits for Claude Mythos Preview and Claude Opus 4.6 as a function of elapsed wall-clock time, with a maximum timeout of 6 hours per instance. The two agents exhibit different temporal profiles. Claude Opus 4.6 saturates within the first 30 minutes, plateauing at roughly 15 successful exploits and making virtually no further progress over the remaining budget. This rapid convergence suggests that Claude Opus 4.6 can solve only a narrow subset of straightforward challenges and lacks the sustained reasoning capacity needed for harder targets. In contrast, Claude Mythos Preview climbs steeply through the first hour and, crucially, continues to accumulate successes well beyond the two-hour mark without reaching a clear plateau. This non-saturating trajectory underscores Claude Mythos Preview's ability to sustain long-horizon agentic workflows such as incremental refinement of exploit primitives, and multi-stage vulnerability chaining, demanding extended, coherent reasoning over many sequential steps. The persistent upward slope also implies that the current two-hour budget under-counts Claude Mythos Preview's capability, and that further time extensions could unlock additional, more complex exploits.



Figure 2: Cumulative exploits over wall-clock time (6-hour max.)

Different Models Solve Complementary Sets of Tasks. Figure 3 shows the overlap among targets successfully exploited by Claude Mythos Preview, GPT-5.5, and the union of all remaining models. While Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 dominate in total count, their success sets diverge considerably: 56 targets are solved exclusively by Claude Mythos Preview and 26 exclusively by GPT-5.5, with only 91 shared between the two. The remaining models contribute 61 successful exploits, of which 57 overlap with the top performers, and 4 uniquely solved by these models alone. Including the extended 6-hour Claude Mythos Preview and Claude Opus 4.6 runs from Figure 2, the overall union rises to 239. This complementary coverage suggests that the models rely on qualitatively different exploitation strategies or reasoning patterns. It also indicates that an ensemble approach of running multiple agents and taking the union of their outputs could expand coverage beyond what any single model achieves.



Figure 3: Overlap of successes across Claude Mythos Preview, GPT-5.5, and union of other models.

Agent Judges Reliably Distinguish Intended Exploits from Unrelated Bugs. To distinguish intended exploits from runs that rely on unrelated bugs, every successful trajectory is scored by two agent judges, Codex CLI with GPT-5.5 and Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.6, using the same prompt, trajectory transcript, exploit files, PoV, and vulnerability description. We validate the judges on an expert audit of 59 successful trajectories sampled across agents and three target domains. Two authors independently labeled whether the proof-of-concept exploit reaches and triggers the intended vulnerable code path and adjudicated disagreements. One trajectory marked *unsure* by both reviewers is excluded, leaving 58 validation trajectories (30 *yes*, 28 *no*). Codex CLI matches the human label on $58/58$ tasks (Cohen's $\kappa = 1.00$), while Claude matches $56/58$ ($\kappa = 0.931$). In both cases, Claude incorrectly labels exploits for unrelated bugs as using the intended vulnerability. In production, both judges score each successful task: agreement is accepted as consensus, while disagreements are escalated to human reviewers. Across 313 scored tasks, excluding experiments run by Anthropic[1], the judges agree on 294 (93.9%). Among the remaining disagreements, the yes/no splits for Codex CLI and Claude Code are roughly balanced, as is the distribution of final human adjudications.

Standard Mitigations Reduce But Do Not Eliminate Agent Success. To assess how real-world defenses affect exploitability, we re-run all successful tasks with standard security mitigations enabled (e.g., ASLR, V8 heap sandbox, see Table 2). Each entry in Table 5 shows the number of successful exploits before and after applying mitigations for each domain. Across all models, agents still succeed on 37 userspace tasks, 20 V8 tasks, and 12 kernel tasks. This result has two implications.

[1]The Claude Opus 4.6 and Claude Mythos Preview experiments used only Claude Code as the judge.



Figure 4: Shortened trajectory of an agent exploiting a V8 vulnerability. Starting from a PoV that triggers an assertion, the agent derives an out-of-bounds read, escalates it to arbitrary native memory reads, and hijacks a virtual `IsCacheable()` dispatch call to execute the privileged flag-reading helper. An independent scorer verifies whether the exploit targets the specified vulnerability.

First, standard mitigations remain effective barriers, eliminating the majority of agent-generated exploits across all categories. Second, the non-trivial survival rate demonstrates that frontier agents can already adapt their strategies to bypass widely deployed defenses. For example, agents bypass ASLR using partial-pointer overwrites and low-bit brute force; escape the V8 sandbox via known rendezvous primitives such as Wasm dispatch tables [15] and Irregexp bytecode [46]; and bypass KASLR by abusing writable static strings such as `modprobe_path` and `core_pattern` [43], or by relying on side-channel leaks [34]. These findings reinforce the importance of defense-in-depth, but highlight that current mitigations alone are likely insufficient to neutralize AI-driven exploitation.

Table 5: Mitigation-bypassing exploits

Model	Userspace	V8	Kernel
Opus 4.6	$12 \rightarrow 0$	$2 \rightarrow 0$	$1 \rightarrow 0$
Opus 4.7	$4 \rightarrow 0$	$3 \rightarrow 0$	$0 \rightarrow 0$
Mythos Prev.	$107 \rightarrow 25$	$38 \rightarrow 17$	$12 \rightarrow 3$
Gemini 3.1 Pro	$10 \rightarrow 0$	$2 \rightarrow 0$	$0 \rightarrow 0$
GLM-5.1	$4 \rightarrow 0$	$0 \rightarrow 0$	$0 \rightarrow 0$
GPT-5.4	$38 \rightarrow 2$	$15 \rightarrow 0$	$1 \rightarrow 1$
GPT-5.5	$71 \rightarrow 10$	$27 \rightarrow 3$	$22 \rightarrow 8$

Case Study: GPT-5.4 Escalates a Debug-Only V8 Crash into Code Execution. Figure 4 shows how GPT-5.4 exploits a type-confusion vulnerability [9, 24] in Maglev, V8's mid-tier optimizing JIT compiler, and achieves unauthorized code execution. In our two-container setup (see Section 3.1, the agent starts from a brief description and a 5-line PoV, originally reported by ClusterFuzz in October 2025 (after the knowledge cutoff date of GPT-5.4). Only the challenge container contains the flag, which is accessible through the privileged `catflag` helper tool. The PoV crashes only in a debug build of *d8*, triggering an internal Maglev assertion in `String.prototype.slice`. On the release build, it only throws a benign `TypeError`. First, the agent confirms that the original PoV does not expose memory corruption on the release target (Step 1), then identifies that the bug is driven by the receiver `shape`, not the concrete `undefined` value. By crafting a plain object whose `slice` property points to `String.prototype.slice`, it forces Maglev to emit a string-length load for a non-string receiver, yielding an out-of-bounds heap read (Step 2). The agent validates this primitive by probing adjacent heap bytes (Step 3). After a direct `/flag` read fails remotely (Step 4), it grooms the heap, leaks stable heap pointers (Step 5), forges a `CachedExternalOneByteString`, and obtains an arbitrary native read (Step 6). It then leaks `puts` from the Global Offset Table (GOT), a per-binary table of resolved library function pointers, derives the `libc` base, and computes the addresses of `setcontext` and `system`. For code execution, the agent places a fake `ucontext_t`, a fake vtable, and the string `"/challenge/catflag"` inside the controlled `ArrayBuffer`. It triggers a virtual `IsCacheable()` dispatch through a forged `UncachedExternalOneByteString`, redirecting

execution through `setcontext` to `system("/challenge/catflag")` (Step 7). Finally, it sends `exploit.js` to the remote service, receives the flag, writes it to its workspace, and completes the task (Step 8). An independent agent verifies, using the description, PoV, trajectory, and exploit, that the exploit targets the specified vulnerability.

This case study should be interpreted within our controlled evaluation environment. The challenge intentionally disables several production mitigations, including ASLR and the V8 heap and renderer sandboxes. When we re-enable these defenses, GPT-5.4 no longer achieves code execution: ASLR prevents reliable pointer derivation, while the heap and renderer sandboxes block the forged-object and `setcontext` pivots used in Steps 6–7. The result, therefore, shows that the agent can turn a debug-only PoV into a fully working exploit for a very complex, real-world target, while also highlighting that modern mitigations remain a meaningful barrier to full browser compromise.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Limitations. First, our tasks do not cover the full space of exploitation targets, such as Windows, iOS, and Android, or applications that run in those environments. Second, we use arbitrary code execution as the success criteria. While this provides a clear and severe measure of impact, it does not capture other meaningful outcomes, such as arbitrary read/write primitives, sandbox escape without code execution, or partial exploit progress. Third, failures may result from refusal due to safety alignment, tool misuse, or other underlying causes unrelated to the complexity of crafting exploit payloads. Failures may also stem from non-exploitable vulnerabilities, where success is impossible. More broadly, our benchmark lacks ground-truth exploits for every task due to the extreme difficulty of exploitation; at the same time, this helps mitigate data-contamination concerns, since complete solutions are not broadly available. Under the two-hour time constraints of our evaluation, frontier agents solve at most 157 tasks, compared to 239 potential solves in the union of our experiment results. Fourth, our results reflect a single, time-gated and cost-gated attempt per task—additional attempts or resources may yield higher success rates. Similarly, our use of a single set of instructions may inadvertently favor one model—tailored instructions, including additional task context, may improve success rates. Finally, we do not provide tools specific to vulnerability analysis or exploitation, integrating such tools may also improve success rates.

Dual-Use Nature of Exploit Generation We reiterate that exploit generation is a dual-use capability of AI agents. Defenders can leverage this capability to assist with detecting and prioritizing which vulnerabilities pose a high-severity risk, especially as AI agents become increasingly capable at vulnerability discovery. For attackers, the same capabilities can reduce exploit development costs, scale the set of exploit targets, and otherwise reduce the barrier to entry for exploitation. More sophisticated attackers could adapt partial agent-generated exploit trajectories into fully-functioning exploits. Resolving these ethical tensions and establishing appropriate safety guardrails requires multi-stakeholder discussions that go beyond the scope of our work. We consider our benchmark and evaluation results as critical to enabling these discussions.

In summary, ExploitGym provides a reproducible testbed for measuring AI-agent exploitation capabilities on realistic and complex targets. Our results show that autonomous exploit development by frontier AI agents is no longer a hypothetical capability. While current agents are not yet reliable across all targets, they already exploit a non-trivial fraction of real-world vulnerabilities, including complex targets such as kernel components. This rapid emergence is itself a central finding, showing that capabilities that would have seemed implausible are now present in deployed frontier models. Given the fast moving nature of AI progress, today's reliability limitations should not be interpreted as durable safety guarantees. Traditional system hardening techniques and defense countermeasures remain effective but imperfect, and must therefore be assessed against AI-driven attackers. Addressing this risk requires both responsible model development and stronger defenses that explicitly incorporate autonomous exploitation into threat modeling.

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A Ethics and Impact Statement

The use of AI agents for vulnerability exploitation raises important ethical considerations due to the inherent dual-use nature of the capability: the same techniques that help defenders assess severity and validate mitigations can also lower the expertise barrier for offensive misuse. ExploitGym is designed strictly for research and evaluation, but it operates in a domain closely linked to cyber-attack capabilities, requiring responsible design and usage.

All benchmark data is sourced from publicly available repositories and vulnerability databases, including OSS-Fuzz, OSV, ClusterFuzz, the Chromium Issue Tracker, kernelCTF, and syzbot. Every included vulnerability has been patched upstream prior to inclusion, ensuring that the dataset does not pose an immediate risk to the software ecosystem. All experiments were conducted under structured access programs (OpenAI's Trusted Access for Cyber and Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program) designed for approved security research. Should our evaluation pipeline reveal previously unknown vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques, we will follow responsible disclosure practices and withhold associated artifacts until patches are available or the standard 90-day disclosure window has elapsed.

Exploit development has long been a core component of security research, underpinning severity assessment, mitigation validation, and defense-in-depth strategies. Our benchmark builds upon this principle by assessing AI agents' capabilities to reason about low-level program behavior and develop exploits in controlled, containerized environments. By doing so, we aim to support research in automated vulnerability analysis and to provide empirical grounding for claims about AI-driven cybersecurity risks.

Despite the potential for dual-use, we believe ExploitGym serves a constructive role. It enables rigorous evaluation under realistic conditions, helping reveal the boundaries of current agent capabilities and informing both AI safety evaluations and defensive investments. Our results show that exploitation remains challenging for most models and that frontier agents can bypass widely deployed defenses in a non-trivial fraction of cases. It underscores the need for continued research into defense-in-depth and responsible model deployment. We emphasize that ExploitGym is not intended to encourage malicious use, and we encourage continued collaboration among the research community, industry, and policymakers to ensure that advances in AI capabilities strengthen rather than undermine software security.

B Benchmark Details

This appendix provides additional details on the data-collection and filtering pipelines for each benchmark category.

B.1 Userspace Software

CyberGym Instances. We source vulnerabilities from OSS-Fuzz via the CyberGym corpus [62], which provides reproducible Docker environments for each bug. Every candidate is a memory-safety vulnerability in a C/C++ project that ships with a reproducer input and an upstream patch. We exclude targets whose fuzzing entry point is a script interpreter that already exposes shell or filesystem APIs to untrusted input (e.g., `mruby`), because in those cases a PoV input degenerates to a line of script and arbitrary code execution is trivially reachable without exploiting memory corruption. Because the original OSS-Fuzz binaries are compiled with sanitizers that abort on the first memory violation and thereby prevent deeper exploitation, we rebuild each target with sanitizers disabled, as well as for different mitigation configurations.

OSV Instances. To complement fuzzer-discovered bugs, we include a set of vulnerabilities in the same OSS-Fuzz projects that were found by other means (e.g., code audits). We collect vulnerability entries from OSV [20] for projects that were actively fuzzed during the period covered by the report. We then remove all bugs explicitly attributed to OSS-Fuzz, as well as entries whose descriptions mention fuzzing. Because these vulnerabilities were not discovered through fuzzing, they do not ship with triggering inputs or PoV artifacts. We retain only entries with concrete patch commits and employ Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.6 to generate PoVs. We then manually inspect each result, keeping only those with valid PoVs that confirm reachability from our selected entry points.

Mitigation Configuration. We toggle ASLR at the OS level, recompile binaries with or without the `-fstack-protector` compiler flag to control canary insertion, and compile with or without the `-fPIE`/`-pie` flags to control position-independent code generation.

B.2 Browser (V8)

ClusterFuzz Instances. We build an extraction pipeline targeting ClusterFuzz reports on the JavaScript component in the Chromium Issue Tracker [54]. We restrict attention to reports filed after 2024, when the V8 heap sandbox was enabled by default, so that the sandbox mitigation toggle is meaningful for these instances. Because fuzzer test cases are private, we instead recover inputs from the unit tests shipped alongside each patch commit. For each report, the pipeline retrieves the patch commit and extracts the accompanying unit test. The parent of the patch commit, together with any commits referenced in the report, is treated as a candidate vulnerable revision. We validate each candidate by executing the extracted test case against the corresponding V8 build and confirming that the vulnerability is triggered. The test case serves as the PoV; we package it with the patch commit, a vulnerable commit, and the full source.

Human-Reported Instances. A substantial number of Chromium Issue Tracker reports are filed by human reporters. We restrict the pool to issues filed after 2024 for the same reason as above, and retain only those that include attachments plausibly serving as a PoV. Because human reports are less consistently formatted than ClusterFuzz output, we identify candidate vulnerable commits via pattern matching on the report text and validate each by executing the attached PoV. To capture an important class of sandbox-violation vulnerabilities, we additionally incorporate bugs reported by SbxBrk [6].

Shell Surface Reduction. The `d8` standalone shell exposes convenience APIs (e.g., `os.system`, `d8.file.read`) that would allow trivial flag retrieval without exploitation. We patch V8 to disable these globals, retaining only the minimal API surface required by real-world PoVs: `setTimeout` (for scheduling), `Worker` (for race-condition bugs), and `d8.serializer` (for bugs that genuinely depend on relevant semantics).

Mitigation Configuration. We toggle ASLR at the OS level and enable or disable the V8 heap sandbox at build time via the `v8_enable_sandbox` flag.

B.3 Linux Kernel

kernelCTF Instances. We draw from submissions to Google's kernelCTF program [21], which provides the target kernel image, the source commit, the build configuration, and a shared root filesystem and init ramdisk. Each entry ships with a ground-truth exploit, a detailed vulnerability description, an exploitation write-up, and a submission spreadsheet with patch references. We use a human–agent collaboration pipeline to simplify each full exploit into a minimal PoV that triggers the vulnerability without performing the complete exploitation chain.

syzbot Instances. We collect syzbot [17, 59] reports targeting the x86 and x86_64 architectures. We restrict attention to high-severity memory-safety bugs (use-after-free, out-of-bounds read/write) and data-race failures. Each report provides a pre-built kernel image, a C reproducer, a build configuration, and both the vulnerable and patch commits. When multiple reports exist for the same underlying bug, we prefer reports from the upstream kernel and select the earliest timestamp. For each selected report, we verify that the provided reproducer triggers the vulnerability against the corresponding kernel build, using the same root filesystem and init ramdisk as the kernelCTF setup. The C reproducer serves as the PoV.

Privilege Control. Inside the QEMU/KVM virtual machine, the agent's process runs under an `nsjail` [16] policy that restricts capabilities, namespaces, and resource limits. The flag is stored on a raw block device (`/dev/vdb`); a process that obtains UID 0 only within a user namespace cannot open the device node, so genuine privilege escalation beyond the sandbox boundary is required.

Mitigation Configuration. We toggle KASLR via the `nokaslr` boot parameter and restrict or permit user-namespace creation through the `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone` sysctl, respectively disabling or enabling this additional attack surface.

C Experiment Details

Models and Agents. We evaluate six models, all accessed through their official API endpoints and paired with their provider's officially recommended coding agent. Where supported, we set the reasoning effort to the highest available level except Claude Opus 4.7 as the early termination is frequently observed. Table 6 summarizes the model checkpoints, agent versions, and reasoning effort settings used in our experiments.

Table 6: Models, agent scaffolds, and reasoning effort settings. All models are accessed through official API endpoints.

Model	Checkpoint	Agent	Reasoning Effort
Claude Mythos Preview	–	Claude Code@2.1.119	max
Claude Opus 4.6	`claude-opus-4-6`	Claude Code@2.1.119	max
Claude Opus 4.7	`claude-opus-4-7`	Claude Code@2.1.119	xhigh
Gemini 3.1 Pro	`gemini-3.1-pro-preview`	Gemini CLI@0.37.2	high
GLM-5.1	`glm-5.1`	Claude Code@2.1.119	auto
GPT-5.4	`gpt-5.4-2026-03-05`	Codex CLI@0.120.0	xhigh
GPT-5.5	`gpt-5.5-2026-04-23`	Codex CLI@0.120.0	xhigh

Experiment Environment. All experiments are conducted on 1) `c4-standard-96` instances provisioned on Google Cloud Platform (GCP), each equipped with 96 vCPUs and 384 GB of RAM; 2) two AMD EPYC 9654 CPUs (192 physical cores / 384 logical cores) with 768GB of RAM; 3) `c4-standard-288` instances on GCP with 288 vCPUs and 1,080 GB of RAM.

Network Restrictions for Agents. To minimize security risks and potential reward hacking through web search, each agent's network access is mediated by an egress proxy. By default, only the Docker internal network is reachable. Outbound connections are restricted to a curated allowlist that permits routine package installation (Ubuntu `apt` repositories and PyPI) and fetching the toolchains required for building V8. All other external endpoints are blocked.

Resource Isolation. Each agent instance runs inside a Docker container constrained to 4 CPU cores and 8 GB of memory, enforced via Docker's built-in resource-limiting mechanisms. This ensures reproducible resource conditions across runs and prevents any single agent from monopolizing host resources.