
#### Google

## Account Protections a Google Perspective



with the help of **many** Googlers updated March 2021





#### Slides available here:

https://elie.net/account






#### 4 in 10

US Internet users report having their online information compromised

Source

the United States of P@sswOrd\$ -Harris / Google poll





# How do attacker compromise accounts?







#### Main source of compromised accounts



Data breach




Phishing




Keyloggers


The blackmarket is fueling the account compromised ecosystem








## Accounts and hacking tools are readily available on the blackmarket







## Volume of credentials stolen in 2016: a lower bound




Data breach 4.3B+ \*\*\*

Phishing 12M+



Keyloggers 1M+



Risk





#### Stolen credential origin takeaways







The black market fuels account compromise

Password reuse is the largest source of compromise


Phishing and keyloggers poses a significant risk How can we prevent account compromise?





## Defense in depth leveraging many competing technologies







Increasing security comes at the expense of additional friction including lock-out risk, monetary cost, and user education




Each security solution offers a different trade-off which makes security a complex balancing act between usability and security





Today: combining key technologies to offer the best account security and usability possible







Part 1

## Preventing credentials theft




Build large scale Al powered systems to detect and block threats at scale before they reach users




Google






Safe Browsing warnings protects over 4 billions devices from phishing, malware






#### Millions of warnings displayed weekly







#### Attackers are shifting to phishing










#### Everyday Gmail blocks over 100M+ phishing emails






#### Cats through the age







#### Drive phishing through the ages














68%


of phishing emails blocked by Gmail are different from one day to the next



Keeping up with constantly evolving attacks requires continuously improving and retraining detection systems. As in evolution the red queen hypothesis applies: it takes all your running to stay ahead of attackers.




How to deal with a borderline case?






Provide as much context as possible and rely on user to make the final decisions



Gmail inbox soft warnings help users decide which emails are phishing



45%

of Internet users don't know what phishing is



#### Takeaways



#### Prevention is a critical first defense layer

It protects billion of users across the world from being phished and infected



#### Keeping up with attack evolutions requires constant improvements

Attackers actively attempt to evade detection thas are major hurdles to them



#### Education and warning design are a must

Make sure that users understand the risks and don't get warning fatigue is very challenging



Section 2


# Resetting compromised credentials proactively



#### Third party data breaches keep surfacing

Dropbox data breach: 68 million user account details leaked


SECURITY



TECHNOLOGY

All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack





#### 66%


## Of US users reuse passwords across online services

Source: the United States of P@ssw0rd\$ - Harris / Google poll










59%

Of the U.S. adults use a name or a birthday into some of their online password

Source

The United States of P@ssw0rd\$ - Harris / Google poll





Get users to use a password manager



#### 15%

of US Internet users use a password manager. 36% use a piece of paper....

Source

The United States of P@sswOrd\$ - Harris / Google poll










We need additional defenses to mitigate password reuse until password managers are ubiquitous



2014

```
Gmail.txt - AkelPad
                                                                   . DIX
файл Правка Найти Кодировки Вид (робранное Настройки Плагины Справка
1232316 adameular@gmail.com:charlie
1232317 re_______@gmail.com:ortec123
1232318 phylicanium 1 @gmail.com:tuliptime1
1232319 volume b@gmail.com:volunteer2008
1232324 more loy@gmail.com:hansford
1232325 roward @gmail.com:n3u538hh
1232326 no...htm@gmall.com:572610
1232327 gc...htm@gmall.com:milomllo11
1232328 shahasasi Madi@gmall.com:9959402183
1232329 btheoreo @gmail.com:118666
1232331 night | m@gmail.com:455h4t
1232332 fun_comet @gmail.com:playgame1
1232333 mark | @gmail.com:666999
1232334 jizzing Pagmail.com:snoopy123
                    ilee@amail.com:terminator.
                           Ins Win 1251 (AVSI - кириплица)
4929085/24
```





#### Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

#### Cleaning up after password dumps

September 10, 2014

One of the unfortunate realities of the Internet today is a phenomenon known in security circles as "credential dumps"—the posting of lists of usernames and passwords on the web. We're always monitoring for these dumps so we can respond quickly to protect our users. This week, we identified several lists claiming to contain Google and other Internet providers' credentials.

Disclosing the existence of our proactive breach password reset program





## 110M+

Google accounts proactively re-secured





















How to protect all internet accounts against compromised password reuse?








Accurate & actionable

**Automated** 

Ideal password warning system properties






## Private set intersection

Allows users to query Google about the breach status of their usernames and passwords without revealing the information queried.












Additional cryptographic mechanism ensure that malicious actors can't use the system to learn leaked username and password.




Password Checkup protects hundreds of millions of users from leaked passwords by displaying tens of millions of warnings weekly







100M+ people have used Password Checkup, and they've seen a 30% reduction in breached credential usage







Password check up on android



Predictive anti-phishing protection





#### Takeaways



Proactive password protections greatly reduce malicious sign-in

People all too often choose easy to guess passwords



Password manager can solve a lot of those issues

Get users to realize how important this is for them







Section 3

# Preventing unauthorized logins



Password only authentication is dangerous







## Use additional information

To prevent hackers logging in with compromised credentials





### Types of additional information



Mass adoption of two factor authentication is challenging



37%

Of US internet users use two-factor authentication


Source

<u>The United States of P@sswOrd\$ -</u> Harris / Google poll










52.5%
of the online se

of the online service don't offer two factor authentication


#### Source

https://elie.net/blog/security/the-bleak-picture-of-two-factor-authentication-adoption-in-the-wild/









#### Some industries don't use standards






Many sites marketing reuse terminology incorrectly and end-up confusing users

https://elie.net/blog/security/the-bleak-pict ure-of-two-factor-authentication-adoption -in-the-wild/










Which type of two factor authentication should we push for?




#### Not all 2FA technologies are equal

Secondary email SMS verification Device prompt Security key


Boutique phishing 68% 96% 99% 100%

Spear-phishing 53-100% 76% 90% 100%





Security keys are the most secure second factor against phishing



Security key built into your phone

How to speed up security key adoption?





Say hello to OpenSK an open-source security key written in RUST





### OpenSK: Design Philosophy







#### Open

Open source, no patents, no NDAs, affordable.




Memory-safe programming language, and secure OS.


#### Research friendly

Cheap & easy to audit your own key, and attack it.



## OpenSK: hardware







#### Paul Rascagnères 🕢 @r00tbsd · Jan 30

New open source project from Google: **OpenSK**. A FIDO U2F and FIDO2 implementation for Nordic nRF52840 board. I'm not an expert but it looks like a #yubikey but with an open source firmware and 5 times cheaper... and great STL files to 3D print the case;) github.com/google/OpenSK/...





ly @NordicTweets nRF52840 Dongle has arrived, so now I can try out







Help manufacturing OpenSK-based affordable security key for everyone



Since Feb'21 Feitan OpenSK research edition key <u>available on Amazon for</u> \$9.90 (not ready for production!)





## What's next? Major milestones

manufacturing

**FIDO 2.1** OpenSK on track to be the first FIDO 2.1 certified key Certification Bleeding edge New features to make keys more secure and usable are actively developped features **Improved** Keep partnering with the industry to develop high

quality affordable security keys






### More information at:


https://github.com/google/opensk





#### Takeaways





Password reuse and phishing makes credentials only login very risky



## Strong two factors is the way to go


Not all 2nd factors are created equals we need to focus on strong two factor adoption



## Industry wide adoption is still very distant

There are a lot of structural problem to solve before we get 2FA as universal as HTTPS


Google







Section 4


# Advanced protection













#### Accounts at risk of targeted attacks









Journalists & hacktivists

Politicians & campaign teams

**Executives & Fintech users** 

**Celebrities** 

### Key threats faced by targeted users



**Spear-phishing** 

Handcrafted phishing attacks with two factor phishing is a common tactic against targeted users



Malicious oauth app


Attackers use oauth app to maintain persistent access to targeted users



Advanced account recovery impersonation


Attackers research their target background and use the collected data for impersonation and phishing purpose





# Realtime password verification and then phishing the SMS code

Google



Increase security further at the expense of additional friction











•	•	Lock-down
٠	٠	login
•	٠	Mandatory
		security keys

Protecting
Session
Limit API Data
Access

Protecting
Session
Squeeze out
malware

Account
Recovery
Stronger
Verification

Google



#### Takeaways



Strong account security requires a defense in depth strategy



Constant improvements are needed to keep-up with adversaries



Additional protections are need for targeted users

#### Google

Effective account security requires tailoring your protections to meet your users needs

https://elie.net/account

