RS∧°Conference2022

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Building Safe End-to-End Encrypted Services for Business a Google Workspace perspective

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
TRANSFORM

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Stronger data privacy needs and upcoming data protection regulations are reshaping the world



Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide



Source: UNCTAD, 14/12/2021

Google

Data regulations and privacy needs are rising



Today Client-Side Encryption is one of the key technology that can help meet those new requirements.




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What is **Client-Side Encryption (CSE)**?







Client-side encryption (CSE) is the set of end-to-end encryption crypto-systems that enterprises can use to ensure that only authorized users can access, authenticate and decrypt specific pieces of data.



Customer feedback

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Certain email contents or recipients are **required** to be end-to-end encrypted (so **Google cannot access the data** under any circumstance). Drive is the same way - for certain information"

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... I just want Google to come up with a solution so that we do not have to use any third parties ... Just one system that covers data storage and communication security."

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Key questions for today



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
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Bad news? This presentation **does not** contain any blockchain, NFT or cryptocurrency related information.









Client-Side Encryption for enterprise



Google Workspace CSE case-study



CSE protection challenges




Malicious URLs detection case study





Client Side Encryption for enterprise





How can CSE help protect enterprise data?





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Client-side encryption ensures that **data stored in the cloud can only be viewed by the company employees** since data is encrypted before being uploaded to cloud providers servers.

Early CSE adopter quote



Client-side encryption use cases



Mitigate data breaches and insider risk Separation of duty increases resilience to compromise



Offer data sovereignty control

Prevent data processing outside of a specific jurisdiction



Support regulatory compliance E.g.: ITAR, CJIS, TISAX, IRS 1075, EAR,...

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Key challenges

01.

Key deployment

Provisioning and management of keys is typically complex and requires additional software and services

Interoperability

02.

Most entreprise CSE solutions rely on proprietary infrastructure not allowing easy collaboration with others.

Smart features

03.

Advanced capabilities require inference with large ML models hosted server-side.

04.

Anti-abuse protection

User safety features are mostly based on complex and proprietary processing on servers.

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Writing suggestions and anti-abuse are examples of server-side powered features that need to be reinvented

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How do you encrypt the data while keeping cloud benefits?





CSE leverages envelope encryption



Data Encryption Key (DEK): key generated on end-user endpoint used to encrypt data (email, doc, file)



Key Encryption Key (KEK): common key used to encrypt and protect many DEKs





Encrypted data and DEK keys encrypted with the KEK keys can be stored safely in the cloud to enable collaboration and ensure data durability & reliability

Benefits of envelope encryption



Private and performant: data encryption is done on the endpoints



Flexible: Allows sharing with different group of users without data re-encryption



Trustworthy: Auditable, highly-protected and delegable to 3rd parties


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What are the trade-offs made when implementing envelope encryption?





Access control options







Option 1 Data readers are set at send time

Asymmetric cryptography using recipient public keys (S/MIME, PGP, Signal,...)

Pros:

- Portability and interop
- Sender controls readers
- Asynchronous and offline


Cons:

- Immutability
- Provisioning
- Discovery





Data readers are set at send time



Option 2 Access evaluated at decryption time

Key service solutions (Google Drive CSE, Microsoft DKE,...)

Pros:

- Access with user identity
- Dynamic access control


Cons:

\mathbf{X}


- Requires key service
- Harder interop/portability



Access evaluated at decryption time
















Google Workspace CSE case study





4) Drive	Q	Search in Drive				
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• •	My Drive	-	Archived Projects 용, 숫	me	Nov 18, 2018 n		
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0	Storage	P	Building Trust.pptx 왔 ☆	Margot Coulins	Nov 18, 2018 n		

Google Workspace Client-side encryption launched on Drive, Docs, Sheets, and Slides in 2022



Workspace's approach to encryption



Sovereignty of data

Authoritative control over data through customer control of encryption keys



No server side access to content

Ensure that data is only accessible by the customer's employees



Preserve user experience

Maintain the same high-quality experience without the need for legacy desktop clients





Workspace CSE Key ACL Service properties

Secure service controlled by the customer

Encrypts and decrypts DEK using KEK

Requires strong user authentication


Provide dynamic access control

Public API allowing partners to build services







Encryption with a Key ACL Service



Decryption with a Key ACL Service












CSE protection challenges







How do you protect users without server side detection?






Potential directions

01.	02.	03.	04.
On-Device Business Logic	On-Device ML Processing	Confidential computing	Private computing
Rebuild product business logic to run on clients	Design and train ML models meant to run on device	Use enclaves to perform remote computation privately	Rely on homomorphic encryption, multi-party secure computation and other techniques to perform computation over


encrypted data



Today: two explored approaches











PIR tradeoffs

Pros:

Cons:



Strong privacy guarantee

PIR security and privacy guarantees and limitations are well understood and researched. Limited operation Can only do exact matching - No fuzzy search for example

Cons:



Large scale databases require heavy computation and privacy trade-offs to scale



Netflix Popcorn PIR database

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
Popcorn's overheads are high when compared to a non-private baseline: for each request, Popcorn **consumes 1080x more computational resources, about 14x more I/O bandwidth**, and **2x longer network transfers**.



https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi16/nsdi16-paper-gupta-trinabh.pdf



How an on-device model works





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On-device model tradeoffs

Cons:

Pros:

 \checkmark

Strict privacy guarantees

Model operates on-device guaranteeing the strict privacy of the detection

Resource intensive Models require significant device compute resources and initial download, but there are techniques to help out.

Cons:

 (\mathbf{X})

Adversarial attacks

Having an on-device model makes it easier for attackers to develop effective adversarial attacks

Cons:

 (\mathbf{X})




Accuracy tradeoff

Fitting models on-device requires scaling down size, which can lead to an accuracy drop.











Experimenting with malicious URLs detection case-study





How do you protect users against malicious links without server side detection?








Current idea Rely on an on-device model

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AI? Really?





Model capabilities



Malicious links detection


Predict if a url leads to a malicious website that will attack the user's machine.



Social engineering link detection

Predict if a URL leads to a site that will phish the user.





Experimental on-device model seems accurate and fast enough to be a good base solution

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Experimental model performance

Parameters	500k	
Size	2MB	
Inference time	~20ms	
Phishing link accuracy	90.3%	
Malware link accuracy	86.45%	
Unwanted software	79.41%	

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
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


Model precision / recall curve

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Rely on an on-device model





Re-imagining protections

On-device models give us the chance to reimagine Workspace protection and push the boundary of what is possible.



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Model capabilities



Malicious links detection

Predict if a url lead to a malicious website that will attack the user machine.



Social engineering link detection

Predict if a URL lead to a site that will phish the user.




Personalized impersonation detection

Detect if user's specific company is impersonated.




How personalized impersonation detection works






Personalized impersonation precision vs recall



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more details in our paper





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
Experimental model demo from this very laptop





Research paper and evaluation data to be released open-source







Takeaways



Protecting end-to-end encrypted services is challenging



There are many promising directions but no silver-bullet



Building advanced CSE protections is a very active research area





CSE services are becoming a critical part of business data protection strategy. They introduce new unique operational challenges that require innovative solutions to offer strong usability, safety, reliability and functionality.





Thank you



